1. The term municipal is used in the customary international law sense, i.e., the internal domestic law of a nation as opposed to private and public law of international character. ' The report continues to the effect that the chamber itself should dvelop a code uf arbitration designed for those business firms which agree in advance to abide by arbitration awards, the enforcement of which is based not upon a legal "but upon a moral sanction, such as can be exercised by the International Chamber of Commerce itself, and by member National Committees, with all the force that business men of a country can bring to bear upon a recalcitrant neighbor.
"Before agreeing to conduct an arbitration outside the law, even when both parties should join in a request, the International Chamber should be convinced that the busines men of both countries concerned are sufficiently well organized and that the business organizations are willing to exert moral pressure, if need be, in favor of carrying out the arbitration decision outside the law, and are sufficiently influential to make such presrure effective." Young, supra note 4, at 1-2.
A pertinent section of the Sub-Commission Report reads: "In the want of an organized federation for the branches of commerce that are not as yet internationally aswciated, the practical American spirit has succeeded in arriving at the same result by means of a convention among the most important Chambers of Commerce in North and South America, whereby the Organizations which are a party thereto pledge themselves over their signature likewise to uphold the institution of arbitration. Thus the merchants of these different countries, when they stipulate an arbitration clause if they should fail to observe it, would be responsible to their own central organization which is officially bound to maintain it; and the fear of merited censure and of the moral and econmic sanctions which the central organization is in a position to enforce against a delinquent member will avail not less than legal sanctions, where these exist, to secure the observance of the pledge that has been given." I XTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COr .RCE, FznsT Co- GRESS, BROcHnn. No. 13 (1921) 15 .
6. In 1931, ten years after the Young report, Mr. Comstock in a report to the Washington Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce commented on the extensive development of arbitration in the United States. Over five hundred commercial organizations had supported arbitration procedure, and 1750 towns possessed arbitration tribunals. underwent during the subsequent decade.' Moreover, the fact that relatively few actions for enforcement of arbitration agreements have been brought into court, far from casting doubt upon the actual widespread use of arbitration, as Mr. Nussbaum supposes, 9 suggests that the Young policy may have been adopted and that it now effectively side-steps judicial strictures.
It has not been the express intent of American legislation or court decisions to foster this kind of development. Fundamentally, "arbitration" 
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9. Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 236-7. Mr. Nussbaum's discussion of arbitration deserves special attention, since from the beginning of the century he has been a prominent supporter of the arbitration movement, but has never lost sight of its inherent dangers.
[Vol. 54: 36 has always been considered merely a "speedy and inexpensive proceeding" o between individuals to resolve or avoid litigation, or to interpret standardization rules of products and marketing methods. The emphasis has been upon the adjustment of specific controversies between parties neither one of which occupies a strongly predominant position and the settlement of whose disputes does not invade the interests of third parties." 1 The danger that arbitrative procedure might be used to overthrow this naturally achieved balance and establish control by monopolies and cartels was not generally foreseen, particularly since arbitration seemed to operate primarily in connection with the product exchanges, a traditional fortress of free enterprise. Nevertheless, such have been the changes effccted by the growth of a more complex and highly organized economy that arbitration now rarely functions at its former simplified level. Few commercial transactions affect only the interested parties; the simplest contract may give rise te unexpected repercussions. And with this expanding sphere of influcnce has come the opportunity for dominant interests to weigh down the balance in their favor. Arbitration, viewed as a social instrument, has moved from the sphere of isolated individual transactions into a realm where its significance in the light of public interest may be overlooked no longer.
TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS UTILIZING ARBITRATION
The arbitration system has its origin in no unified or coherent plan. Dvveloping as an instrument of independent organizations, both in the United States and abroad, its pattern may be traced through the various organizations which have made use of it. Agreements to arbitrate questions not 10. The facts reported in Electric Research Products v. Vitaphune Corp., 20 Del. Lh. 417 (1934) , make it appear doubtful whether arbitration tribuvals are as decient as usually alleged: 162 hearings were held, about 8000 pages of testimony reported, M50,74 10 was paid for expenses including $1000 per day for each arbitrator-and no dccision was rendered.
11. The difference between arbitration between individuals and modern organized arbitration or arbitration dictated by leading commercial concerns becomes obvious vhen contrasted with the arbitration provision in George Washington's will:
"... my will and direction expressly is, that all disputes (if unhappily any should arise) shall be decided by three impartial and intelligent men, hnown for their probity and good understanding; two to be chosen by the disputants, each having the choice of one, and the third by those two-which three men thus chosen shall, unfettered by law, or legal constructions, declare their sense of the Testator's intention; and such decision is, to all intents and purposes, to Le as binding on the Parties as if it had been given in the Supreme Court of the United States." Cf. Kent, Pioneers in American Arbitration (1940) 
It is clear that this arbitration clause can hardly have effect hkyond tiL prti, ft tiv controversy.
susceptible to private adjustment are employed by three general types of organizations: (1) by individual business entities-corporations and the like-one of which may be in a sufficiently strong position to control both the terms of the commercial agreement (of which the arbitrative agreement is a part) and the arbitration tribunal itself; (2) by exchange institutions and trade associations devoted to the advancement of particular products or trades, arbitration agreements being controlled by these organizations in all matters concerning members or members and third parties; and (3) by the International Chamber of Commerce, and, on a lesser scale, bydocal or city chambers of commerce.
In each of these instances it seems apparent that, if the dominant coinmercial interests are sufficiently strong, few of these controversies will come into court. 2 Moreover, the spread of proceedings may be limited even within these three categories, for, if the tribunals set up by the first two types of organizations function efficiently, it is not improbable that they will absorb the majority of controversies, leaving few to the International Chamber of Commerce, or to local commercial organizations, a fact which Mr. Nussbaum may have overlooked. [Vol. 54: 36 certain patents, relating to hard metal composition, from the German firm, Krupp, granted a license for manufacture to Firth-Sterling Steel Company on the express condition that its prices, terms and conditions of sale for all tools and dies made of hard metal composition should be no more favorable to the customer than those to be established from time to time by Carboloy.' 5 The agreement between Carboloy and Firth-Sterling provided for arbitration of controversies which the parties were unable to adjust between themselves," 0 and through a supplementary instrument IT the form of arbitration procedure was agreed upon: "For the period of one year from March 1, 1931 , the parties hereby appoint Harold Norberg... as the sole arbitrator over controversies which may arise between the parties or either of them concerning violations of their respective obligations to maintain the prices, terms and conditions of sale established from time to time by Carboloy. . . . The arbitrator in performing his functions shall act impartially between the parties." 11 Since the Mr. Norberg in question was at the time of his appointment and subsequently an employee of Carboloy," 9 there seems hardly any doubt that arbitration was used here by Carboloy both to control prices at the expense of its licensee and to prevent such a scheme of price fixing from coming into court.
'A similar predisposition to control through arbitration is illustrated by the conditions of sale contained in sales contracts in almost every field of business. A conference called by governments in Rome in 1928 to discuss unification of sales law was confronted with the argument that such unification had in fact already been achieved by private groups without participation of governments or legislatures. 20 Thus the inclusion bf arbitration clauses takes the interpretation of privately dictated rules out of court and centralizes it in private hands. 2 many instances restricted to persons who could be expected to conform to prevailing policy, and especially to those belonging to formal buyerseller organizations or trade associations. The exchange ceased to be merely an agency for the collection of orders for purchase or sale and, particularly in regard to products traded in international markets, became the meeting place of these buyer-seller organizations. Max Weber correctly describes these changes 22 in referring to the English Cotton Trade Association and the Corn Trade Association as exclusive clubs having absolute autonomy in regard to the principles of common law applicable to the business transactions in their field. 2 3 Of the many conditions required for membership most notable has been the enforced acceptance of the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal established either within the exchange institution or within the affiliated trade associations. Still proclaiming their function to be standardization, these tribunals helped the associations of the new exchange institutions to establish themselves as supreme arbiters of the trade and to maintain rigid restrictions beneficial to controlling groups or cartels. 24 Tribunals, as a result of this development, now not only promulgate rules regulating the activities of all who deal in products within the scope of the exchange institution, or trade association, but serve as "courts" entitled to the rule of stare decisis in all matters subject to their jurisdiction. And this jurisdiction has grown most extensively. The basic arbitrationi agreement of the International Bulb cartel gives to its permanently established tribunal the power to dispose of all questions arising out of both th original contract, of which the arbitration agreement is part, and any amendments made thereto pursuant to the by-laws of the cartel. The only matter with respect to tribunal jurisdiction left open to question is apparently the essential validity of the original contract.
In the capacity of disciplinary agencies, tribunals exact loyalty to the orders and regulations of trade associations. A rule established by the Diamond Center and recently imported to the United States from Antwerp 26 provides that "the penalty for non-compliance with a decision or (1931) , for court enforcement of foreign exchange awards. The plaintiff and defendant, buth citizens of New York, contracted for the sale and delivery of a quantity of zinc concentrates to the plaintiff in the United States. The contract provided that all differences arising thereunder should be "arbitrated in London pursuant to the law of Great Britain." As a result of such an arbitration proceeding an award was made against the defendant and enforced by a New York court. See infra p. 46.
32. The report of the Fortieth Conference of the International Law Association designated the following rules of the Incorporated Oil Seed Association as typical: "I. Any dispute arising out of a contract embodying these rules shall be referred to arbitration in London, each party appointing one arbitrator, who shall be a member of the Association or a partner in a member's firm, or a director of a company represented by a member.., whose decisiun is to be final.... III. In the event of one of the parties refusing that, although parties may ordinarily select their own arbitrators, the rules of most exchanges limit the choice to members of the institution. The experience gained by exchange institutions and affiliated trade associations has motivated cartel organizers to utilize the arbitration device for their own purposes, 34 making use of the three basic functions of tribunals-legislative, judicial and disciplinary. " The effectiveness of a cartel depends upon the extent to which the obligations of its members to sustain price and to remain within the market assigned to them can be enforced, and also upon the extent to which members' customers can be made subject to cartel rules. A "controlled" arbitration tribunal having jurisdiction over all litigation between cartel members and over all disputes relating to the cartelized product offers more than adequate opportunities to secure the ends desired by the cartel management. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this fact in the statement: "It may be that arbitration is 'well adapted to the needs of the . . . industry but when under the guise of arbitration parties enter into unusual arrangements which unreasonably suppress normal competition, the action becomes illegal." Il
The International Chamber of Commerce. Representative of the final type of organization utilizing arbitration, the International Chamber of Commerce, 37 unlike exchange institutions and trade associations, promotes to appoint an arbitrator, or neglecting to do so for seven days after notice in writing of such an appointment by the other ... or in case the arbitrators shall not within seven days after their appointment agree to an award or appoint an umpire, or in case after the appointment of such arbitrators or umpire they or he or any of them shall die,... then upon application by either of the disputing parties, and provided the applicant pays at the same time to the secretary of the Incorporated Oil Seed Association the sum of 12 2 s,, the Executive Committee shall appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire who shall be members . . . of the association to fill the vacancy or vacancies so arising ... V. In case either party shall be dissatisfied with the award a right of appeal shall lie to [Vol. 5;4: 36 no particular product or trade, but seeks rather to join varied commercial interests-Morgan, Westinghouse Electric International Company, Bankers Trust Company of New York,"' to name several American firms-in the common purpose of facilitating international commerce. The Chamber takes jurisdiction of all members' controversies provided they are of international character, a fact determined by a central committee composed of -until the outbreak of the war-representatives of twenty different nations. 3 9 The unique feature of the Chamber is the appointment of arbitrators by national committees of countries specifically designated by the central committee. A nation such as Switzerland, for example, liberal in its treatment of cartels," 0 may be intrusted with the task of appointing arbitrators. Subsequently the central committee may send these "liberal" arbitrators to a foreign country to render their decision-even to the domicile of the party against whom the award is to be made.' The reason for this mobility of arbitrators becomes apparent in the light of the rule that an arbitrator is free to choose whether his decision is to be bound by municipal law; he may choose-providing the opposing party does nut object-to act merely as an amiable cornpositeur, in which case he is ni t bound by the law if the land, or as arbiter, in which case he is. If he declares himself hound, then whether it is by the law of the forum or some other law will depend either upon his own discretion or upon the terms of whatever contract is in controversy. 4 3 At the conclusion of his deliberati ins the deeis, oi is returned to the central committee which determines whether the award shall be left to enforcement by courts or treated as a case "outside the law." Like the operations of exchange institutions, a loose procedure of this kind seems only too easily to lend itself to the exercise of cartelized power. On behalf of the commercial interestwhich it undertakes to protect the central committee may at its discretion utilize the municipal law which proves to be the most advantageous and the most expedient."
In order to provide for the decreasing number of occasions when arbitration cases come into court, pro-arbitration groups have sought to foster a receptive judicial attitude toward foreign arbitration decisions. The "extra-territorial jurisdiction" 41 of arbitration, i.e., the international attainment of this objective regardless of the municipal law of the forum, 40 has been noticeably extended as a result of two important American cases. In Gilbert v. Burnstine, 4 7 an action on a contract made in New York and performed in the United States and involving two American litigants, the defendant refused to appear before an English arbitration tribunal in derogation of the contract, believing that he could defend his case in the American courts even though he might be required to pay "damages." The New York court, however, declared that the decision of the English arbitration tribunal was final. Besides holding as a general rule that, where a foreign tribunal has once assumed jurisdiction and made an award, the decision must not be disturbed by any court, the opinion seems to adopt the view that two American firms, and by logical inference either an American firm and a foreign firm or two foreign firms, may in their mutual dealings free themselves from the restrictions of American law and the jurisdiction of American courts to which they would otherwise have been subject; that the acts of an arbitration tribunal established abroad are valid providing they are valid under the law of the "situs" of the tribunal; and that the decision of a foreign tribunal is binding on the 44. Although the American Arbitration Association does not operate for the most part within the scheme here suggested, since it is largely concerned with labor-management problems and with arbitration between individuals where the decisions do not effect third parties, the Association is very active in propagandizing tile entire field of arbitration. [Vol. 54: 36
parties even if one of the parties did not appear in the proceedings before the tribunal, provided that this was in accordance with the law of the "situs." In the Silverbrook case,*" where arbitrators were removed into a foreign country for the sole purpose of rendering their award, 9 a federal court similarly concluded that it could not "direct and otherwise supervise and conclude an arbitration to be held in London, or... vacate, modify, or correct any award that might be made...
[or] reform, or modify the terms of the contract by ordering an arbitration elsewhere or otherwise than agreed upon by the parties." 1 In assuming this position, therefore, these cases " would appear to have immunized foreign arbitration awards against any interference and made possible indiscriminate enforcement.Y 2 The legal reasoning basic to these two decisions, moreover, seems highly specious and susceptible to a consistent explanation only on the most abstract level of conflict-of-laws theory. Under the Burnstinw rule foreign arbitrators have the status of agents of the parties to the original contract with power of attorney revocable only by consent of the litigants. In the Silverbrook case, on the other hand, arbitrators are regarded as agents of the state in which the tribunal has its "situs." 61 This inconsistency, although explainable by the rationale that, on the one hand, an arbitration agreement is substantive and therefore governed by the law of the place 53. It is somewhat startling that an act of an arbitrator, hitherto owing allegiance only to the private parties who secure him, must be treated as an act of a foreign state.
where the contract was made,"" while, on the other hand, the actual "arbitration" and the award is a procedural matter referrable to the law of thb forum,"' nevertheless seems to underscore the facility with which theories may be manipulated to advance the principle of "extra-territorial" arbitration. Parry v. Bache, 5 " a Florida case in which a federal court enforced an arbitration agreement-inconsistent with the law of Florida-on t1ie ground that "arbitration goes to the remedy," may well be matched with Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing Thomas Corporation, 7 where a Pennsylvania court enforced a New York arbitration agreement because of its contractual character which required the substantive law to govern.
Among the foreign contributions to the principle of "extra-territorial" arbitration are the Geneva protocols of 1923 and 1927, the former guaranteeing recognition of agreements which provide for foreign. arbitration," 8 and the latter the enforcement of foreign arbitrative awards. 0 " Following in the spirit of these protocols, however, the courts of most commercial nations appear to have gone further and adopted the rule of the Silverbrook case, as decisions of the German Reichsgericht 00 (Clunet) , 849-51] and assumes responsibility for its promulgation, the Burnstine and Silverbrook rules appear tu have had considerably greater significance in securing enforcement of awards. To some extent these rules transcend even American state and federal arbitration laws, since the former take effect whether arbitration statutes are in force or not. Their advantage is particularly evident in their procedural operation. In the absence of an arbitration statute, a cause of action at law in derogation of an arbitration agreement can be reduced to a nullity by securing a more rapid termination of the arbitration proceedings than is possible for the simultaneous court proceeding. Thus a defendant is enabled to put in a defense of a foreign tribunal award that will prove fatal to a complaint as long as the defense is not raised later than court procedure will allow. Only in this latter event does lack of an arbitration statute prove disadvantageous to practical arbitration; for under state and federal statutes as well as under the Geneva treaties arbitration agreements are enforced by interposing stay orders in court proceeding-, until the tribunal decision has been reached, the ensuing award then being enforced by court last war. 66 That this development has come with the expansion, through cartels, of private government regardless of and beyond the borders of political frontiers is shown in the opinions of the French Court of Cassation" In declaring binding an agreement between two Frenchmen which provided for arbitration in London, the Court virtually admitted that its decision was founded not so much upon any theory of law as upon the practical necessity' of submitting to the dictates of powerful interests in the trade; the world market would be lost to Frenchmen if they were barred from arbitration in the English Corn Products Exchange." 8 The extent to which "extra-territorial" arbitration may upset even the domestic law of the United States is indicated by a decision which compelled a resident of one state to appear before a tribunal situated in another state. In the Nippon case, 69 the Pennsylvania court issued a decree compelling a party domiciled in Pennsylvania to appear before an arbitration tribunal in New York, since such a measure was the only means of enforcing the contract. Yet, even a superficial study of the principles of specific performance demonstrates the reluctance of American courts to give positive instructions to persons to perform acts outside jurisdictional boundaries. The Pennsylvania court seems to have regarded the arbitration tribunal as a public court of equal authority."° Indeed, the arbitration tribunal was perhaps placed in a preferential position, since there is no record of similar injunction in a case involving the jurisdiction of a foreign court.
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In circumventing the dangers arising from "extra-territorial" arbitration as disclosed in the foregoing exposition, the argument usually made is [VCol. 54: 36 that they may be met successfully by the "public policy" defense in a suit to enforce a foreign award. 2 Yet the facts show that with respect to the enforcement of even a foreign judgment the "public policy" defense has been successfully employed but once and then only in a case not involving a commercial transaction. 3 In no instance has an American court refused to enforce a foreign arbitration award because of its inconsistency with public policy. Pro-arbitration groups, however, fearful that the courts may become aware of the real developments and may take a position favorable to the "public policy" defense, have advanced the suggestion that nations "provide for the recognition of all arbitration agreements and awards in all cases except where it would be considered as offending against the common conscience of civilised nations." 7* It is not improbable that this program was drafted with the American anti-trust legislation principally in mind; in any event the adoption of such a program would tend to nullify the "public policy" defense." Pro-arbitration groups have attempted, moreover, to proselytize legislative bodies as well as courts by employing the technique of contrasting the superior arbitration system of foreign countries with those of the United States and vice versa. In 1921 the two reports of the International Chamber of Commerce "' attempted to convince European legislators of their "reactionary" 7' attitude in not accepting the "American system" of 77. See the Sub-Commission report: "In European countries, pervaded as they are by individualistic traditions, organized institutions that curtail and limit the liberty of their citizens for the common good, encounter an insuperable resistance, and even in the fields of industry and commerce the spirit of association is not much in evidence, and with difficulty submits itself to the discipline and to the restrictions which would be impo:ed by the public interest upon the liberty of individuals." INTRNATIONAL C -. arbitration, advocated by Mr. Young, which in fact did not become a functioning reality in the United States until some years later. Similarly, a joint Congressional committee preparing federal arbitration legislation was told that commercial arbitration had existed in France for 360 years, 78 whereas France in reality was the last of the nations to adopt arbitration of an organized commercial nature. 7 Again, in 1943 in connection with war contract termination legislation,"' the Senate was erroneously informed that other nations, particularly France, were agreeable to the submission of the national government to arbitration tribunals. 8 ' Much point has been made also of the fact that arbitration is inconsistent with the principles of totalitarianism,$' but even a superficial survey of German cases between 1933 and 1942 reveals that this inconsistency is merely theoretical. 8 3 Moreover, judicial nullification of the amendment of the German Civil Procedure Act of 1933,4 one of the few domestic statutes of any nation designed to curb the exploitation of economic power through arbitration, illustrates National Socialism's advocacy of "controlled" arbitration.
BREAKDOWN OF LEGAL RESTRAINTS
The success with which cartels and international commercial interests have exploited "extra-territorial" arbitration necessarily engenders a com- 83. A study of the KARTELL RuNDSCHAU shows the very broad application of the arbitration device in Germany.
84. The amendment, [1933] RIcIsGEsETzBLA'rr I 787, adding § 1025 II to the Conr OF CIvIL PROCEDURE, declared arbitration agreements to be "without any effect if any party to the agreement exploits its economic and social superiority for the purpose of compelling the other party to enter an arbitration agreement by virtue of which the compelling party would obtain a stronger position [than the other contractees] with respect to arbitration procedure, especially in the appointment or rejection of arbiters." The Kammergericht, however, subsequently ruled that these provisions were not applicable to cartel arbitration agreements, since market regulation by cartels was considered of greater importance than the purposes for which the amendment was enacted. mon interest between nations in the character of their individual municipal law, since the law of one nation governing arbitration may now be imposed upon that of another. The failure of most legal systems, however, to recognize the ascendency of arbitration as means of national and international market regulation, and to shape its operations in accordance with the demands of the public interest, has resulted in the yielding of successive judicial powers to arbitration tribunals. Only a few courts have resisted the trend, and those with little success. Everywhere, in the capitalistic world at least,s" legal restraints upon arbitration have been relaxed.
I;dependence of Tribunals. A distinctive feature of the increasing power of arbitration tribunals is their independence of municipal law. In England " and the states of this country which have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act," conformity between the law as applied by arbitration tribunals and as applied by the courts has generally been believed to be assured by the right of the parties, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal, to have the case "stated" to a court for its binding legal opinion. However, in a recent English case, E. E. & Brian Smith, Ltd. z. Wheatsheaf Mills, Ltd., s the court largely overthrew this rule. The technical legal question of whether a buyer may ask for damages after requesting judgment entitling him to reject the goods was returned by the court to the arbitral tribunal for decision; the group of businessmen was deemed hetter equipped to interpret the "customs" and "habits" oof trade than was the courL By reason of this precedent it is difficult to comceive either when "custom" purposefully evolved by an associati mn w,,tuld not succeed in place of the law of the land, or what legal rule is nOt included in this definition of "custom."
In those states of the United States which have nut adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, arbitration tribunals are not considered bound by the law of the land. In Bryson v. Higdon," a North Carolina court stated simply that arbitrators are a "law unto themselves." " In other ostuntric the development is moving in the same direction. In French, Belgian, Italian, certain South and Central American and some Portuguese courts (the so-called Latin group), as well as in the courts of a number of Swiss cantons, arbitrators have, in the past, been considered "bound by the rules of law." "' This principle, however, has been nullified by an interpretation which raises the presumption that whenever merchants agree to arbitrate they actually intend to subject themselves to amiables compositeurs, not arbiters. 2 Tribunals Adjudicate Validity of Contracts. A second illustration of the courts' relaxation of controls over arbitration tribunals is the manner in which tribunals have been permitted to assume the prerogative of passing upon the validity of the very contract by which they have been established."a Cartel organizers formerly were concerned by the fact that the concept of freedom of contract alone did not completely immunize arbitration agreements from judicial interference;" arbitration tribunals could render awards enforceable in the courts only if the contract submitting controversies to the jurisdiciton of the tribunal was valid in accordance with the rules of conflict of laws." A means of overcoming this limitation upon the "extra-territorial" function of arbitration was devised by -einrich Ehlers," draftsman of intei:national cartel agreements between American, British, and German manufacturers of low tension machinery. -le sought to protect the cartel agreement and the awards made thereunder against challenges based on the anti-trust legislation of the United States. Excision of the arbitration clause from the cartel agreement proper and its inclusion in a special agreement, supposedly endowed by the parties with an independent existence, was the simple means to this end. Thus, it could be argued that the arbitration agreement remained in force even if the cartel agreement was judged void. In this scheme, Ehlers merely adopted the doctrine of separability developed by the Swiss courts, and thereby succeeded in making the arbitration tribunal the final judge of the validity of the cartel agreement itself."
By employing two discrete pieces of paper, therefore, or merely by stating the intention that the arbitration clause contained in the principal agreement is to be considered distinct from the remainder of the contract, a tribunal may obtain power to decide whether the contract by which it was established is legal. The English courts, at least by dicta, have em- [Vol. 54: 36
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BUSINESS ARBITRATION braced this latter theory. In Herman v. Darmwvhis, Lord Porter made the following statement: "If two parties purport to enter into a contract and a dispute arises whether they have done so or not, or whether the alleged contract is binding on them, I see no reason... if at the time when they purport to make the contract they foresee the possibility of such a dispute arising, they should not provide in the contract itself for the submission to arbitration of a dispute whether the contract ever bound them or continues to do so.... it may be true to say that such a contract is really collateral to the agreement supposed to have been made. . . . .
"1
Thus, another judicial threat to the independence of action of arbitration tribunals is removed.
Although foreign tribunal decisions determining the validity of the principal contract containing an arbitration clause would appear to be enforceable in the United States under the Burnstinc rule,1 0 " the question ruled upon by Lord Porter has not yet been raised in United States courts of higher instance, nor has the separability practice of employing two distinct documents received outright approbation."" A change of this character in the relation of arbitration to substantive law may. have an important effect upon the relation between arbitration and governmental agencies normally charged with the control of certain contractual relationships. In Kramer v. Uchitelle, 0 2 a controversy arose concerning the compliance of a sales contract with an OPA order forbidding future delivery of "cotton gray goods" at a price exceeding the maximum "regardless of any . . . that by agreement of the parties any controversy concerning the existence, scope or effect of the obligations assumed under the contract is a controversy 'arising under' the contract and also 'in relation' to the contract, and that such a controversy must be 'settled by arbitration' in accordance with the contract made by the parties." 103 The maj6rity, in giving judgment for the seller, however, did not uphold the arbitration clause, since there were no disputed arbitrative facts in issue but merely the question of contract validity. The fact that a government agency was the limiting factor with respect to the contract may have influenced the court's decision, particularly in view of the difficulties raised by the similar circumstances of a German case decided in 1939.114 There the Oberlandesgericht Muenchen was confronted with the decision of a cartel arbitration tribunal which had ordered a member to pay a fine for failure to comply with a cartel price rule; the rule in turn could be obeyed only by violating a regulation of the price commissioner. The court decided against the cartel member on the ground that the arbitration tribunal, while necessarily having knowledge of the price commissioner's regulation, did not by its finding establish any inconsistency between administrative and cartel rules. Doubtless it was not the court's intention to deprive the commissioner of the power to interfere in a cartel pricefixing scheme violative of his regulations, but, in respect to the relations between cartel parties, the court left the final decision on the effect of the price statute to the arbitration tribunal. At all events, it seems hardly material whether this principle of separability is ultimately adopted in the United States since, ini view of the "extra-territorial" function of arbitration, the foreign practice upholding the principle will be enforced as the law of the land.
Tribunals Take Jurisdiction of Public Instruments: Patents, Trademarks, Corporations. One of the most conspicuous fields in which arbitration tribunals have usurped judicial control-and even control by government agencies-is in the realm of patents and trademarks, and, to a lesser extent, of corporation law. The supervision of these legislatively established instrumentalities, situated strategically for purposes of control in the public interest, has long been lodged with the courts. As long as courts with proper jurisdiction remain in a position to declare a patent void or unprotected against infringement, cartels or other monopolistic agreements using patent monopolies to exclude outsiders and patent licenses to control members must break down. Cartel organizers, therefore, sensing this threat and observing the truth of the statement that a patent is "little more than a certificate which gives its holder the right to go into court and sue for infringement," I0" have sought to bring infringement 103 suits, as well as litigation involving priority and validity of patents, under the jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals. Wedded to arbitration, the patent takes on a new regulatory significance. Cartel members may agree among themselves, and with customers or other contractees of their members, that litigation referring to certain patents is to be submitted exchsh,e y to the cartel tribunal. It is true that an award by a tribunal affecting the validity of patents binds only the parties to the case, together with those who, under pertinent contractual obligations or the provision of by-laws, are bound to recognize such a decision. This means that, while the "public-atlarge" is not bound, the entire trade constituting the cartel is so obligated. Although an award growing out of an interference proceeding before a tribunal does not bind the Patent Office, it is questionable who would have standing to contest an arbitration decision if all the principal parties in interest were already before the tribunal.
Organizers of national and international cartels have reason to regard tribunal patent decisions as. enforceable and a guarantee of the continued use of patents as instruments of cartel control. The decision in Cavichi v. Mohawk Manufacturing Company "o" is indicative in this respect. The parties had agreed that certain patent litigation which might arise should be decided by arbitrators. When one of the parties refused to comply with the tribunal award adjudicating him an infringer, a bill for enforcement of the award was filed under Article 84 of the New York Civil Practice Act. The defendant objected that a decree granted upon such a bill would interfere with the provision of Article I, Section 8 of the Federal Constitution, giving the United States exclusive jurisdiction in patent matters. The Supreme Court, following the decision of the New York court, 0 7 ruled that the issue was not a patent but an arbitration problem and that the states had jurisdiction in all arbitration matters within their own boundaries, whatever the substance of the case decided by the arbitration tribunal. Although it is not at all certain that the court would have come to the same conclusion in a bill for the specific performance of the arbitration agreement had the defendant not appeared before the tribunal,' this decision, has become the basis of present active propaganda 100 in favor of wide adoption of arbitration in patent disputes between two or more industrialists. Moreover, the case indirectly opens the way for arbitrative decision as to the validity of the patent, since this is a determination inherent in a suit for infringement. 10 Cartel interests have even attempted to employ arbitration in an effort to deprive the Patent Office of its traditional function of determining priority among inventions. In Hartford Empire Company v. United States "' the defendant glass manufacturers, Hartford Empire Company and Owen-Illinois Company, agreed to resolve any patent controversy among themselves. Ostensibly to consider evidence of priority, two arbiters were appointed, but, as stated in the brief for the United States, "while thus acting as a private tribunal for the settlement of their conflicts by negotiation designed to obtain the strongest patents for the pool, rather than by arbitration, Hartford and Owens informed the Patent Office that they intended to arbitrate the pending interferences in order to show that the 'Owens-Hartford controversies are not being settled without a consideration of the evidence in each case.' Another reason was to conceal the fact that Hartford and Owens were using the ostensible arbitration proceeding to settle interferences in a manner most beneficial to them, regardless of the evidence of priority." 12 As a result, out of 138 interferences only 8 were decided through award of priority as established by evidence available to the Patent Office.
International cartel organizers and the friends of domestic patent arbitration 113 profeds to believe that the public interest is sufficiently protected by the mere possibility of an infringement suit or other court proceeding brought by or against persons outside the cartel organization. The relevance of public interest to private patent suits and the objection to the solution of, any patent case by purely private tribunals on grounds of public interest becomes clear in Judge Jerome Frank's dissenting opinion in Aero Spark Plug Company, Inc. v. B. G. Corporation." 4 "As we said recently in Picard v. United Aircraft," ' stated Judge Frank, "there is more at stake [in a patent case] than the issues between the two parties. The decision of my colleagues relieves appellee but leaves appellant free to sue others as alleged infringers, putting them to the expense-notoriously great in patent suits-of defending themselves. It is well-known that threats of such suits, because of that expense, often induce alleged infringers to accept licenses on onerous terms rather than to engage in litigation. As the exercise of a patent monopoly is publicly injurious when an invalid patent remains at large, the public interest is therefore deeply involved. And as, under the existing patent statute and decisions, no one on behalf of the public can institute a suit to have a patent declared invalid we should, I think, avail ourselves of this opportunity to wipe out the patent .... An invalid patent masquerading as a valid one is a public menace." 11o In the Mllorton Salt case 117 the Supreme Court fully realized the scope of the public interest properly intrusted to courts in patent matters. Under the rule of this case a patentee may base no complaint upon a patent if it is used beyond the authorized grant. The rule is applicable not only where a party to the suit has been damaged by such violation, but equally where damage has occurred either to any other individual or to the public at large. Arbitration agreements relating to patents would seem to frustrate the effect of this decision no less than they frustrate control by the courts."1 8 In the trademark field manipulation of tribunal decisions to the detriment of court and government control has been largely the same as in the field of patents. Cartels seek to defend trademarks 11 employed as certificates of cartel membership,° as well as the trademarks of their leading members, against the allegation that such trademarks are of generic character and therefore not within trademark law. A German case 11 illustrates the extent of this protection. The Reichsgericit ruled in 1931 that the trademark "Naehrbier" registered by a German brewery was generic and should be stricken from the register. Subsequently the defendant continued to employ the term "Naehrbier" and included it among his regis-116. 130 F. (2d) 290, 292 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) . 117. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 433 (1942) . 118. In patentee-licensee agreements arbitration has also been used to effect the same purpose. In Galion Iron Works & Mffg. Co. v. Adams Mfg. Co., 128 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), the court impliedly declared valid the contractual provision "that the arbiter should be vested with sole authority and power to receive, consider and decide upon any complaint presented by either party claiming violation of the licensed contract with respect to prices, terms of sale and payment of royalties. If the arbitrator should find that the contract had been violated in any of these respects he w.-as authorized to assess as liquidated damages and not as a penalty less than 100 per cent or more than O per cent of the total royalty payments payable." Id. tered trademarks. Other brewers followed suit, using the trademark in accordance with the promulgation of the Reichsgericht. By 1934 all German brewers, including the plaintiff and the defendant, had become members of an association whose by-laws contained a general arbitration clause, The plaintiff in the earlier case now brought before the arbitration tribunal of the association a new suit against a brewer who used the word "Naehrbier," seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that the term "Naehrbier" wds not generic and that defendant be enjoined from using it. The tribunal, comprising well-known persons in the brewery industry, decided in favor of plaintiff, thus reviving the trademark extinguished by the Reichsgericht. It seems plain, therefore, that as long as any potential party at interest was bound by the "law" of the organization, the refusal of state authorities to register the trademark lost any practical significance. Had the defendant brought suit in the courts for annulment of the arbitration decision, he might have met with success, but his relations with his association would have been jeopardized.
The facility with which arbitration has tended to undermine control by courts and governmental agencies in patent and trademark problems, may serve as some.warning of a similar evolution in the field of corporation law. The corporation, though the nerve center of private business on the one hand, is subject, as an entity created by the state, to legislative restrictions which give it in part the character of a public instrumentality similar to a patent. Although there have been too few cases to clarify the position of American courts, historical precedent has shown that legislation designed to control corporate activities may be nullified through the use of arbitration and the substance of corporate law changed to the detriment of the public control of corporations. This was the fate of the so-called Bubble Act 122 in England during the eighteenth century. According to Mr. DuBois,"' its restrictions on corporate business following a period of disastrous speculation were entirely abrogated by practices such as that used by the South Sea Company in adhering to its own board of arbitrators, a system so successful "that the business corporation appeared in the courts relatively infrequently.... Legal issues were decided by counsel opinions or by' submission of disputed points to arbitrators. A trend in this direction may be indicated in a New York case 125 involving. the balance of power between stockholders. Two plaintiffs and defendant, the sole stockholders of a small firm, had agreed to retain one another in a position with the company for life provided faithful service was rendered, and to arbitrate any disputes according to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. When the plaintiffs, representing a majority of the board of directors, discharged the defendant, he appealed to the arbitration tribunal which by reason of several complications for which the parties were not responsible was unable to complete the arbitration. A new demand for arbitration was interposed by the defendant, but the plaintiffs sought redress in the courts, declaring the arbitration clause void and inconsistent with public policy. They reasoned, apparently, that arbitration used in this connection was contrary to the legislative sanction establishing and controlling corporations and, moreover, that the creditors of a corporation had an interest in good management which could not be protected by a tribunal established solely by three stockholders. In finding the arbitration clause nevertheless valid and enforceable, the court seems to have passed over a self-evident fact: that creditors, representing the public, have an inherent interest in any transaction governing the conduct of a corporation. And this seems no less so in the case of a small corporation than in a large one, since in both instances actual management is in the hands of a few. The natural consequence of decisions of this kind may be the evasion of the public responsibility of corporate organizations through the medium of arbitration. An even bolder approximation of this end is indicated in the English case, Beattie v. L. F. Beattie, Ltd.,'2" in which the court declared lawful provision in the "articles of association" that "a dispute between the company and a member shall be referred to arbitration." 127 Principle of Revocability of Arbitration Agreements Overthrown. The limiting principle that arbitration agreements are revocable is everywhere subject to attack even in the case of common-law arbitration. Arbitration is effective as a tool of trade associations or cartels only where persons agreeing to arbitrate are bound to submit future as well as present controversies to arbitrative tribunals. To achieve a degree of moral and legal persuasiveness in attaining this end, advocates of arbitration advance the theory that negotiation with respect to future controversies is a contractual matter clothed with the sanctity of "freedom of contract," and that decisions based upon agreements arising therefrom have the authority of the stare decisis rule. Although this type of negotiation may have the appearance of contract, the appearance is deceptive since true contractual relations postulate the absence of economic duress, a condition inimical to the aims of cartel organizers. Moreover, characterization of arbitration agreements of this type as solely a matter of "freedom of contract," is incompatible with the traditional reluctance of English courts to permit persons to agree to "keep out of court."
Pro-arbitration groups, however, buttress their position by suggesting that the traditional English dislike of arbitration agreements 128 has its origin not in any legal arbitrative defect but in the desire of judges to prevent loss of income, since decisions disfavoring irrevocable agreements to arbitrate and the dictum from which they sprang 129 were decided at a time when salaries were still largely derived from fees. 130 Another explanation, offered by Judge Frank,' is that the courts shortly after Coke's day succumbed to the "hypnotic power" of the phrase "oust the jurisdiction." 132. In explaining the traditional position against arbitration, of whieh he disapproved, Lord Campbell stated: "Where an action is indispensable, you cannot oust the Court of its jurisdiction over the subject, because justice cannot be done without the exercise of that jurisdiction. That is all, and there is no doubt about that. This is the foundation of the Appeal to historical example is often tenuous, but even in the particular instance chosen, Vynior's case, 133 no theory of judicial rapaciousness is necessary to explain Coke's dictum; it merely conforms with the law of the period. 34 Nevertheless, such has been the success of these arguments that few modern cases support the older English view. ' In Park Construction Company v. Independent School District No. 32 130 the court declared that a Minnesota statute containing an arbitration clause which covered future litigation only within a specified scope should be interpreted as permitting unlimited scope to such clauses. "It is enough," stated the opinion, "that the legislature has declared for arbitration, both statutory and commonlaw. That fixes the policy of this state for, rather than against, arbitration." -"7 This decision indicates even with respect to common la,.,, the final removal of the means by which courts may curb the execution of agreements designed to submit all forms of litigation to arbitration. Far from inhibiting the growth of arbitration by succumbing to the "hypnotic power" of legal phrases, the present-day courts have been more inclined to respond to the hypnotic power of "independent arbitration."
Principle of Impartiality Weakened. Arbitration tribunals have also sought escape from judicial restraint by attempting to attenuate the established principle of "impartiality of judges." In the famous case of Dr. Bonham," 3 Lord Coke rebuked the censors of the Royal College of Physicians for imprisoning a physician who had practiced his calling without a license. "The censors were to receive one-half of the fines," states the opinion, "and therefore are not only judges but parties in any case that comes before them. It is an established maxim of common law that no man can be judge in his own case." 13' In startling contrast appear the words of a modern court of review in First National Bank z. Clay "I": "All was also a member of the cartel management. The basis for the decision was that the functions performed in cartel management were exercised not by the individual per se but in his capacity as a member of the corporation board to which the management had been entrusted.Y 4 5 The president of a German cartel, experienced in the actual operation of organized arbitration and viewing in 1925 such decisions with alarm, appealed to public and government .alike to remedy this kind of "impartiality" which, if unchecked, would place in jeopardy the public faith in justice.
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Self-Enforcement of Awards. Although it is usually assumed that the recipient of an arbitration order is legally free to disregard its directions until forced to submit by decision of a court, 4 1 the emergence of a selfenforcement policy in connection with tribunal orders represents the final breach between arbitration and the law. A recent writer claims that because of differences in national legislation international commercial arbitration must rely "upon moral rather than upon legal sanction. would appear, however, that it is not "moral consideration," but an effective self-enforcement policy that influences the "honest business man" in obeying the orders of the arbitration tribunal. This, indeed, is the basis of Mr. Young's system of "arbitration outside the law," as is well demonstrated in the Merrifield-Ziegler case. 14 In dismissing a petition to declare the agreement between the Liverpool Cotton Association and the Bremen Exchange void, an agreement requiring expulsion of the recalcitrant members of either association, the Chancery Division made the following statement:
"[The agreement] ... is, according to the evidence, the result of attempts to bring Continental associations formed in the interests and for the protection of the cotton trade into line with the association, and to inaugurate between the members of the association and of the Continental associations a code of dealing and conduct similar to that already obtaining betwveen the members of the association intcr so. The importance of Liverpool, as the controlling centre of the cotton trade in Europe, necessarily results in members of the association being in constant contractual relationship with traders on the Continent, and, experience having demonstrated the difficulties not infrequently arising in enforcing judgments and awards out of the jurisdiction, the association determined to take stepb to remove these difficulties and to facilitate the settlement of disputes with foreigners and the obtaining of prompt settlement of claims for payment and damages, and, by making the advantages reciprucal, to secure and retain the confidence of Continental buyers. This policy... falls United States,' where the Supreme Court condemned as suppressing normal competition an arrangement whereby the organized motion picture industry obliged its members not to do business with any firm which refused to sign a standard contract. Disregard of arbitration awards was made punishable in the Paramount case by requiring the offenders to furnish substantial guarantee funds before permission was granted to resume business relations with members of the industry. Only slight differences appear in the Ziegler type agreement and the motion picture industry arrangement. In the latter the self-enforcement of awards is a part of the buyer-seller arrangement, whereas in the Ziegler case it is conditioned upon the actions of participating trade associations not directly connected with the sales contract. From the point of view of anti-trust legislation there is no discernible difference between the two self-enforcement systems. It is not inconceivable, however, that unless the prevailing favorable attitude toward the arbitration device is modified, this slight distinction may serve as grounds for sanctioning the Ziegler type of self-enforcement. American firms need not become direct participants in an expulsory scheme inconsistent with the anti-trust laws. The disciplinary compulsion is accomplished indirectly. In international commerce in raw materials it is sufficient that the foreign buyer alone be governed by the rules of an association-as set out in the Ziegler case. Whenever he deals with an offending American firm he is immediately expelled from his trade association with the result that American firms which fail to comply with foreign association rules suffer restricted trade relations. An American seller, therefore, is as much subject to conditions dictated by foreign associations as though he were directly within their jurisdiction. To attack this formidable restraint in trade by means of anti-trust legislation presents the gravest difficulties. Yet evasions of this kind are dangers which should not be discounted. 5 2
CONCEPTS OF LAW UNDERLYING MODERN ARBITRATIVE DEVELOPMENT
Franz Klein, at the beginning of the century, sanguinely envisaged a great expansion of arbitration, ultimately penetrating the law with farreaching effect comparable to the historical rise of equity. 1 " 3 Already arbitration has intruded far into the legal system, but the analogy with equity seems ill-advised. No theory in support of organized arbitration can conceal the essential "lawlessness" of this form of "private government." Equity, on the other hand, originally inspired by the church, strengthened the legal process by drawing it closer to the demands of natural justice. Law and equity together, under the control of persons devoted to the service of the state, became elements of social coordination; organized arbitration, serving no "social justice," has become an element of dissolution. Supporters of arbitration have argued, nevertheless, that social justice may be served through organized groups and tribunals, citing as examples city and feudal tribunals of the Middle Ages. But this contention appears to overlook the fact that in the mediaeval hierarchy of organizations duty and obligation played a prominent part, the lower levels of society adhering to upper levels and both reaching the supreme, [Vol. 54 : 36 object of obedience in the sovereign. In contrast, exponents of modem arbitration are bound only by common commercial interest, and if their policies are consistent with the social or political ideals of a nation it is more likely the result of accident than of design.15
Even religious history has been suggested as a source of ideological support for arbitration. ' Sanction for the avoidance of courts has been found in the fact that not only the Jewish tradition preferred Rabbinical scholars as judges to professional judges, but early Christian doctrine also distrusted secular courts. 1 5 Nevertheless, these arguments would seem to work against themselves: Christian judges and the scholars of Torah were preferred because they considered themselves bound by lav. whereas pagans and professional jurists often did not.
Divorced from an ideal of social justice and designed to avoid the law, modem arbitration would seem to rest basically upon Kelsen's theory of law. " ' 7 This neo-Kantian view emphasizes the cleavage between the moral and social order, on the one hand, and "the law" on the other. Since there is no relation between the two according to this theory, persons in a position to exert political or legislative power would seem to be justified in creating the kind of law most suited to their needs. Arbitration seems clearly a product of this type of thought. It is questionable, however, whether Kelsen's additional principle that the "law" is identical with the "state" '58 gives adequate protection against abuse by private groups. Such a principle would seem to require an ethical standard of "justice" which Kelsen considers irrelevant in this connection. Left to its own recourse, the "state," in the Kelsen philosophy, becomes as morally without purpose as the "law," and both become neutered instruments of groups in a position to exercise power. Modem realism, on the other hand, encourages accepting as "law" any effective rule of society. According ta this view, whatever arbitration itself effectively accomplishes, even if accomplished through a system of "private government," must be regarded as the "law." A constructive service might be contributed by realists if this broad approach were encouraged as a means of analyzing the phenomena of socio-legal institutions, but without necessarily requiring acceptance of the ultimately disclosed facts as "law."
However classified, the underlying concept of law which permits the development of the Young system to its present stage is colorless and with-out aim. Having no task it is a ready tool of those who would make use of it. Although totalitarian nations represent an extreme instance of the unprincipled use of this tool, in substance the distinction between this and present non-totalitarian understanding of the relation between state and law is a matter of degree.
CONCLUSION
An instrument of cartels and monopolistic trade associations, modern arbitration appears not only to be incompatible with general concepts of positive law, but even to attack in principle the practical mandates of the Constitution. To effect protection of individuals against 'the unlawful exercise of "judicial power," the scope of the due process clause must not be limited to acts of formal "'judicial" bodies. It must include acts of organizations which attempt to usurp judicial power. To a certain degree the courts have unlawfully exercised judicial power-or failed to exercise it-in condoning this usurpation. Although the difficulty of restoring arbitration to its original function as a device for settling disputes between individuals-a device limited and circumscribed without touching wider interests than those of the parties involved-seems insurmountable in the light of the present highly organized economy, the restoration of arbitration to a function "within" rather than "outside" the law seems a goal of paramount importance. Court procedure must be expanded and made sufficiently effective to serve the public interest as well as justifiable demands of modern business. Until this is accomplished, both by domestic legislation and international convention, the public and the government should be assured that organized arbitration does not violate principles of law, social justice and national interest. Temporarily, it is suggested that the rule enunciated in the Paramount-Famous Lasky case be enforced; that government and private parties be permitted the right to appeal to the courts in all arbitration cases provided the public interest is affected;1 that the right to a declaratory judgment be assured in order to determine whether trade customs under the control of trade associations or monopolistic enterprises are consistent with general principles of law; that licenses be granted by courts to business organizations appearing before foreign, tribunals or engaged in complying with foreign tribunal awards or compromises; that the Burnstine and Silverbrook rules be abolished. Immediate legislative action to prohibit entirely the use of arbitration in connection with patents, trademarks, and the law of corporations is also necessary. A similar prohibition would insure the immunity of government 159. A sensible exercise of this right depends upon opening files and tribunal sessions to government representatives.
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